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*New York  University 1.  _  Introduction 
The  division  of social  security  (OASI) benefits  into an annuity  portion 
and a transfer  portion has been well documented,  I have discussed 
extensively  in previous work  (1987b, 1988, 1990, and forthcoming), 
Burkhauser  and Warlick  (1981) previously.  My methodology  is quite 
this issue 
as did 
similar  to 
theirs.  The  annuity portion  is defined  as the benefit  level  the worker  would 
receive  on the basis of his(her)  contributions  into the social  security  system 
(OASI)  if th,e  system were actuarially  fair.  The calculation  is based  on the 
:%  .,:  _ 
worker's  estimated  earnings history  and actual  social  security  tax rates.  The 
4 
transfer  portion'  is the difference  between  the actual  social  security  benefit 
received  and  the actuarially  fair annuity  equivalent.  As we shall  see below, 
it has  been  uniformly  positive  for workers  who have  retired  on or before  1983. 
Burkhauser  and Warlick  examined  the relative  proportions  of annuity 
versus  transfer  benefits  by  income class and age group.  However,  they did not 
conduct  an extensive  examination  of the overall  distributional  implications  of 
the social  security  transfer portion.  Nor did they consider  the tax 
implications  of treating social  security  transfers  as taxable  income.  These 
are the principal  subjects of the current paper. 
With  regard  to the distributional  implications  of the social  security 
system,  I will  examine  three sets of issue.  First,  I will  consider  what  the 
relative  magnitudes  have been  of the annuity  and transfer  portions  of social 
security  income.  Since I have  data for three years,  a related  issue is -2- 
whether  the relative  proportions  have changed over  time.  Second,  I will 
consider  how  the social  security  transfer portion  has  affected  the 
distribution  of income among elderly households.  Has  the transfer  component 
been  neutral  or has  it tended  to redistribute  income  toward  lower  income 
elderly  households?  Third,  the same issue can be addressed  with  regard  to 
household  wealth,  in which social  security benefit  flows are transformed 
(capitalized)  into wealth  equivalents. 
From a policy  point of view,  the more interesting  issue is how do the 
total  taxes  of the elderly change with the removal  of  the exclusion  of social 
security  transfer  income  -- that is, when social  security  transfer  income is 
treated  as taxable  income.  There are three questions  of interest.  First, how 
does  the change  in tax treatment affect  the post-tax  distribution  of income. 
Second, which  groups  of elderly  are most affected  by  the change  in tax 
treatment.  Third, what  is the total change  in the magnitude  of tax revenues. 
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As  a final,point  of policy  interest, I will  also  consider whether  the 
extra  revenues  generated  by the new tax treatment  of social  security  income 
can serve  as a "social security capital  fund" to reduce  the growing  wealth  gap 
among age groups  in the U.S.  As will become  apparent  in the analysis,  the 
social  security  system has been quite generous  to today's  elderly,  providing 
them with benefits  far in excess  of their contributions  into the system. 
Moreover,  young  families have  fared rather poorly  over  the last several 
decades  in regard  to their income and wealth  accumulation.  I will  propose  a 
policy  vehicle  below,  called a "social security  capital  fund", which  can serve 
as an additional  source of capital  for today's young  workers.  The source of 
the funding  can potentially  come from the extra  tax revenues  from elderly 
households.  It is thus also of interest to analyze  whether  the additional  tax 
revenues  are large or small relative  to the wealth  holdings  of young -3- 
households  and whether  such a fund can make a significant  difference  in the 
well-being  of younger  families. 
My  analysis  will be based  on the most recent  comprehensive  wealth  survey 
kurrently  available,  the 1983 Survey of Consumer  Finances  (see Avery  et. al., 
1984).  The  file contains extensive  information  on the net worth  of households 
at the microdata  level.  The sample also includes  a high-income  supplement. 
In my  sample,  the asset and liability  figures  are aligned  to national  balance 
sheet  totals  for the household  sector  (see Wolff,  1987a,  for details).' 
2.  _  Background  and  Motivation 
Between  1962 and 1983 the mean net wealth  of households  in the United 
States  showed  a cumulative  growth of 49% after  accounting  for increases  due to 
inflation,  an average  annual rate of about 2%.  During  this period,  there was 
;* ", 
subs?&t.ial  variation  in how growth was spread  among  different  sectors  of the 
population,  particularly  with regard  to age.  In previous  work  (Greenwood  and 
Wolff,  1988),  we documented  a fairly substantial  shift  in family wealth  away 
from the young  and old to the middle-aged. 
The most  significant  finding  is that the 
cohorts  declined  relative  to the overall  mean 
average  wealth  of younger  age 
between  1962 and 1983.  The mean 
wealth  of households  under 35 declined  from 27 percent  of the overall  mean  to 
20 percent.  The corresponding  figures  for households  under 45 are 50 percent 
in 1962 and 40 percent  in 1983.  On net, over  the two decades, younger 
families  were worse  off in relative  terms.  The average  wealth  of households 
under  35 grew by 0.58 percent per year  in real  terms,  compared  to 1.90 percent 
overall,  and the mean wealth  of families under  45  increased  by 0.80 percent 
per year.  The relative wealth  of families  70 years  and older also decreased 
over  the two decades,  from 46 percent  above average  in 1962 to 22 percent 
above average  in 1983. -4- 
The big winners  over 
69.  Their  average wealth 
the two decades were  families  between  ages 45 and 
increased  from 1.35 to 1.74 of the overall  mean,  or 
at an annual  rate of 3.10%.  Families  in the 45-49  age bracket  improved  their 
relative  position  the most over Zhe 1962-83 period,  from 0.98 of average  in 
1962  to 1.77  in 1983; families  in ages 60-64 increased  from 1.34 to 1.73; and 
those  in ages 65-69 increased  from 1.74 to 2.38. 
The net result over the two decades was a redistribution  of wealth  from 
the young  (under 45) and the old  (70 and over)  to the middle-aged  (45-69). 
Between  1962 and 1983, peak wealth  moved  from the 55-59 age group  to the 65-69 
age  group,  and the peak became  substantially  higher.  Over  the two decades, 
the resulting  age-wealth  profile  thus became  "humpier",  with  the peak higher 
(2.38 compared  to 1.82) and occurring  for an older  age group  (65-69 age 
bracket,:compared to the 55-59 age bracket). 
i-”  Q’ 
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?Thi.s  changing pattern  of wealth  holdings by age group has profound 
implications  for the access  to resources  in our society.  In particular, 
resources  are shifting away from those most in need,  namely  younger  families 
and  the very  old, to those of middle  age.  Especially  hard hit are young 
families  with  children.  The shifting  age-wealth  profile  thus has  rather 
disturbing  implications  for the well-being  of children.  The most obvious  is a 
falling  homeownership  rate among young  families,  and,  indeed, a rising  rate of 
homelessness.  Rising poverty  among children  is another  implication  of the 
change  in the availability  to resources  among age groups.  Since childhood 
poverty  also affects educational  achievement,  the shift  in available  resources 
may  also  result  in a lower skilled  labor force in the future,  lower 
productivity,  and a fal  ling s  tandard  of living  in our society. 
3._--  Policy  Analysis -5- 
This  paper will  examine one potential  policy  vehicle  for tilting the age- 
wealth  profile  back  in favor of the young.  This  involves  a mechanism  of 
taxing  social  security benefits  and using the proceeds  as a fund of available 
credit  for younger  workers.  The proposal  is directly  related  to a plan 
currently  in effect  in Singapore,  which allows younger  workers  to borrow 
against  accumulated  pension  savings,  These  two plans  have  the effect of 
increasing  the resources  available  to younger  families.  My proposal  will also 
provide  a redistribution  of resources  from older  families  to younger  ones.  In 
addition,  it may directly  increase  savings,  since  the funds can be earm,arked 
for investment  purposes  only. 
The proposed  mechanism  will work  in the following  way:  Social  security 
benefits  received  by workers  consist  of two components.  The  first is an 
annuity.or  "pension  equivalent",  which  is based  on  the individual's 
,i . 
contribution  to the social security  system over his  (her) lifetime.  The 
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pension  equivalent  can be imputed with available  data.  The second,  or 
residual  portion,  is a direct  transfer payment  from  the government  to the 
individual.  Current  retirees,  as well as workers  in their 50s and early 6Os, 
have benefited  from legislative  changes  in the social  security  law which 
provide  them with  significantly  greater social  security  income  than would be 
justified  by their contribution  into the social  security  system.  The 
government  is, as  it were, providing  them with extra  transfer  income. 
The  annuity  or pension  component  should be  left untaxed,  since  this 
portion  was already  treated as taxable  income when  the individual  received  the 
wage  or salary  income.  The other portion  is simply  a transfer payment,  and 
this should be treated  as ordinary  taxable income  like property  income. 
Indeed,  this portion  was never  taxed by the government,  since  it does not 
devolve  from the social  security  contributions. -6- 
The  proceeds  can then be used as an investment  fund 
In a sense,  the worker  is using his or her contributions 
for younger  workers. 
for OASI  as 
collateral  for a loan.  The loan may be  restricted  to housing,  for educational 
purposes,  or for other  specified  investments.  Since the federal  government 
has already  set up loan programs  for many purposes,  including housing  and 
student  loans,  this part of the proposal  is by no means  revolutionary.  The 
only new provision  is to treat OASI contributions  as collateral  for loans. 
However,  it should be noted  that the security  of such loans 
it is the federal  government  itself which  receives  the OASI 
Moreover,  the funding  for this program  is made available  by 
is airtight,  since 
proceeds.' 
the increased 
,  revenues  from taxing  social  security benefits.  It is, of course,  necessary  to 
make  the requisite  calculations  to determine  the extent  to which  such 
increased  revenues  can provide  investments  for younger  workers  and the 
*a  ..  . 
dist$ibutional  consequences  of such a program. 
4.  _  Account_aFramework  and Estimation  Procedures 
A wealth  accounting  framework  is employed  in order  to divide  soc_ial 
security  benefits  into their constituent  parts.  Let us first define 
conventional  household  wealth,  HW, as the sum of (i) owner-occupied  housing 
and other  real estate;  (ii) bank deposits  and other  liquid assets;  (iii) bonds 
and other  securities;  (iv) corporate  stock;  (v) equity  in unincorporated 
business;  (vi) trust fund equity;  (vii) the cash surrender value  of life 
insurance;  and  (viii) the cash surrender  value  of pension  plans;  less  the sum 
of  (i) mortgage  debt and  (ii) other household  debt.2 
There  are two forms of social  security  "wealth" considered  here.  The 
first  is called  social  security  entitlement  wealth,  SSEW.  Following  Feldstein 
(1974, 1976),  I define  SSEW as the present  value  of the discounted  stream  of -/- 
future  social  security benefits.  For symmetry  , we can also define  (private) 
pension  wealth,  PW, as the present  value of the discounted  stream  of future 
(private)  pension  benefits.  The second  is social  security  annuity  wealth, 
SSAW.  This  is defined as the accumulated  contributions  (OASI) made by  3 
employees  and employers  into  the social  security  system.  This  represents  the 
savings-equivalent  of these  social  security contributions  if the contributions 
were  put  into a pension  reserve.  Like a pension  fund, these contributions  are 
accumulated  over  time with  the going  interest rate.  In effect,  social 
security  contributions  are treated  as if they are made  into a "define\d 
contribution"  pension plan,  the benefits  from which  are based  directly  on the 
contributions.  SSAW thus represents  what  the total wealth held  by or for the 
benefit  of the household  sector  would have been  if social  security 
contribu.tions were placed  in a pension  reserve.  3 
.5  _ 
iEstimation.  The imputation  of social security  wealth  involves  a large 
4 
number  of steps,.'which  I will  summarize  here  (see Wolff,  1987b,  or Wolff, 
1988,  for further  details).  I begin with entitlement  wealth.  For retirees, 
(r) the procedure  is straightforward.  Let SSB be  the social  security  benefit 
currently  received by the retiree.  Then, 
(1)  SSEW = *JLE  SSBeCg  -  'jtdt 
where  LE  is the conditional  life expectancy,  g the expected  average  annual 
rate of  growth  of real social  security  benefits  over time for retirees,  and 6 
is the real discount  rate.  4 
For pension  wealth,  the procedure  is analogous.  Among  current 
beneficiaries,  let PB be  the pension  benefit  currently  being  received  by  the 
retiree.  If it is assumed  that pension  benefits  remain  fixed  in real  terms 
over  time  for a particular  beneficiary  (as was generally  true in 1983),  then 
pension  wealth  is given by: -a- 
(2)  PW = ,s""  PBe-6tdt 
Social  security  accumulations  consist of the accumulated  contributions 
(OASI) made by employees  and employers  into the social  security  system  on 
behalf  of each individual,  This  is a hypothetical  concept,  since  there are no 
actual  reserves  in the social  security  system  that correspond  to this amount.5 
It is first necessary  to estimate  social security  accumulations  for current 
workers.  The first step is to estimate  annual  earnings  for each worker  from 
the start  of working  life to the present.  These  are based  on earnings 
functions,  which  are estimated  separately by sex, race, and schooling  level. 
In particular,  the sample  is divided  into 16 groups  by  the following 
characteristics:  (i) white  and non-white;  (ii) male  and female,  and  (iii) 
less than 12 years  of schooling,  12 years of schooling,  13 to 15 years  of 
;' '- 
schozling,  and 16 or more years.  For each group,  an earnings  equation  is 
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estimated  as follows: 
Ei = b, + b, Ai + b, Ai  + b, Si + ei, 
where  E, is current  annual  earnings  of individual  i, Ai is current  age, Si 
educational  attainment6,  and  E is a stochastic  error  term.  The earnings 
function  for individual  i is then adjusted  so that  it passes  through  the 
individual's  earnings  in the current year.  7  Then, 
E*i(t)=  [6, + bl(Ai + t) + b2(Ai + t>* $-  baSi] .  Ei / ii(t) 
gives predicted  earnings  for individual  i at age Ai + t, assuming  no growth  in 
overall  real earnings.  Accumulated  earnings,  AE,  from  the start of working 
life to the present,  are then estimated  on the basis  of the actual  real growth 
in average  earnings  and the real discount rate: -9- 
AE, -  ;  E",(t).% 
t=-t, 
w"nere  to is the number of years  at work  (estimated  as current  age less years 
of schooling  less 5), y, is the current  year  (1983), y is the calendar  year 
given by yC + t, k,  is the real growth  of average  earnings  in year Y,~ 6, is 
the real discount  rate in year y, and 
5  =  II  (1  +  6,  -  kj), 
j=r 
which  gives  the present value  of earnings  in year y. 
9 
Future  earnings,  FE, from current  age to age 65, are estimated  in 
analogoys  fashion."  Two values  are assumed  for future  real earnings  growth 
*e  .;.  _ 
(k)  : -k one percent  per year and two percent  per year.  Results  are similar  for 
the two values  and are shown below  for only k equal  to 0.01.  The  total 
lifetime  earnings  of worker  i, TLE,, is then given by: 
TLE, = AE, + FE, 
In the second  step, it is assumed  that each worker  was continuously 
employed  from the end of schooling  to the current  year y, (1983 in this case) 
and that  the employment  and coverage  status  of each person  remained  the same 
over  the person's  work 1ife.l'  Let r.,  be  either  twice the employee  social 
security  tax rate  in year y or the self-employed  tax rate in that year, 
depending  on the employment  status  of the worker,  and SSMAX, be  the maximum 
taxable wage base  in year y in constant  (1983) dollars.  The social  security 
wage base,  SSWAGE,  in year y for a covered  worker  with  earnings  E*i is then 
given by: -lO- 
SSWAGE(y) - MIN  [Eki(y - 1983).H,, SSq] 
where MIN  indicates the minimum  value  of the two arguments  and 
Hy  =  l?  (1  -  kj), 
j=y 
Then,  social  security annuity  wealth  for covered workers  is given by 
(3)  SSAW,,,  = 2  I, SSWAGEi(y)F, 
Y=Yo 
where  yO = 1983 - tO, the year  in which  the person began working,  and 
.Fy  = l? (1 - &j)? 
_' 
j=y 
.;  ‘I 
For.  current beneficiaries,  the appropriate  concept  is the present  value 
of benefits  that would be  strictly  calculated  as an annuity  on the person's 
accumulated  contributions.  Unfortunately,  there is no information  available 
on past  earnings or contributions  into the social  security  system  in'the  SCF 
database.  It is assumed  that a retiree  in the nth percentile  of social 
security  benefits  for his age group was also in the nth percentile  of the 
distribution  of total lifetime  earnings  at retirement  (assumed to be  age  65). 
SSAWw  n is then computed  for a worker  of age 65 in the nth percentile  of  the 
earnings  distribution.  This value  is then appropriately  discounted,  depending 
on the year of retirement  of  the beneficiary,  to obtain  SSAW,. 
The difference between  SSEW and SSAW is what  I will call "social  security 
transfer wealth,"  SSTW.  It can be defined  formally as: 
(4)  SSTW = SSEW  -  SSAW -11- 
Finally,  we can define  total household  wealth,  TW,  as follows:'2 
(5)  TW = HW + PW + SSEW 
r 
Discount  Rate.  Two sets of discount  rates are used  in the calculations. 
The first  set is based  on treasury bill  rates.  Before  1983, the discount  rate 
is the real one-year  treasury  bill rate in each year,  estimated  as the nominal 
one-year  rate less the change  in the CPI). For 1983 onward,  the real lo-year 
treasury  bill rate is used,  estimated  as the current  nominal  rate less the 
average  rate of increase  of the Consumer  Price Index  (CPI) over  the previous 
10 years.  The second  is based  on the average  annual  real rate of return  on 
the average  household  portfolio  over the 1962-83 period.  I calculated  that 
the average  annual  real rate of return  for the average  household  portfolio 
tL  ;,  ,. 
over%his  period was  3.28 percent.  (The source  is Greenwood  and Wolff,  1990.) 
c 
5.  _  Distributional  Implications 
A.  Relative  Dimension  of Social  Security Transfers  and Annuities.  It is 
first of  interest to examine  the overall  ratio of the social  security  transfer 
component  to the total social  security benefit.  This  is shown  in the last 
line of Table 1 for all households  65.  Overall,  social  security  transfers 
amounted  to 66% of total social  security  income  for households  65 and over  in 
1983 on  the basis of the treasury bill discount  rate.  Burkhauser  and Warlick 
(1981), whose results  are based  on the 1973 Social  Security  Exact Match  file, 
which  merges  individual  records  from the 1973 Current  Population  Survey with 
OASI  earnings  and benefit  records,  calculated  a ratio  of 0.73.  In previous 
work,  I estimated  a ratio of 0.85 for the 1969 data.  Another  study which 
attempted  comparable  calculations  is Hurd and Shoven's  (1983) paper.  They -12- 
computed  an overall  ratio of social security  transfer  income to total social 
security  benefits  of about 0.80 for 1969 on the basis  of the Retirement 
History  Survey.  These  results together  indicate  that social security 
transfers  comprise  a rather large (perhaps,  surprisingly  large) proportion  of 
social  security  income.  In other words,  the benefits  received  from the social 
security  system  have  far outweighed  the annuity  value  of the social  security 
contributions.  Thus, much of the social  security  benefits  received by 
retirees  is a pure  government  transfer,  over and above  the actual 
contributions  made  into the system by the retirees. 
The  three methodologies  are quite different.  Burkhauser  and Warlick 
based  their  computations  on actual earnings  and OASI histories;  Hurd and 
Shoven  based  theirs on actual earnings histories,  though  imputed social 
security:  contributions;  whereas mine are based  on imputations  techniques  for 
both%arnings  histories  and OASI contributions.  Despite  the differences,  the 
& 
results  still  strongly  suggest that the transfer  component  of social  security 
income has been  declining  over time (that is, the annuity portion  has been 
rising).  This  is mainly  a consequence  of the fact that the system  started up 
in 1937, so  that older retirees payed  into the system  for fewer years  and had 
much  lower  contribution  rates than more recent  retirees. 
Another  source  of difference between  my results  and those of Burkhauser 
and Warlick  is that they use a rate of return  in accumulating  social  security 
benefits  which  is equal to the annual rate of return  on government  bonds  plus 
the average  annual  increase  in average  stock prices.  This return  is higher 
than  the straight  treasury bill rates, which  will have  the effect  of 
increasing  the relative proportion  of the annuity  component  in social  security 
income.  I also made a second set of calculations  on the basis  of the average 
annual  rea  1 rate of return  on the average househo  Id portfolio  over  the 1962-83 -13- 
period.  On  the basis of this discount  rate,  I calculated  an overall  ratio of 
social  security  transfers  to benefits  among  elderly  households  of 0.61.  As 
predicted,  this is lower than  the 0.66 ratio based  on the treasury  bill rates, 
though  thes  difference  is not substantial. 
It is next of interest  to compare  the sensitivity  of the results  to the 
value  of g, the expected  average  annual  rate of growth  of real social  security 
benefits  over time (panel 1 of Table  1).  For this, we  look at the ratio of 
social  security  transfer wealth  (SSTW) to total social  security  entitlement 
wealth  (SSEW).  The value of SSEW  increases with  g, since  the value  of future 
social  security benefits  are higher.  Since  SSAW does not vary with  g, the 
value  of social security  transfers  also rises with g.  On net,  the ratio of 
SSTW  to SSEW  is found to increase  with g, though  the differences  are not great 
(0.63 to 0.69 in 1983 on the basis  of the treasury bill  rates  for g varying 
_ 
from%.01  to 0 03). 
The  ratio o'f  SSTW to SSEW  is also found  to increase  systematically  with 
age group,  In 1983, the ratio varies  from 0.65 for those in age group 65-69 
to 0.73  for those 80 and over on the basis  of the treasury bill  rates. 
Burkhauser  and Warlick  found a similar  result  for their 1973 data:  The 
transfer  component  as a proportion  of the total social  security  benefit  varied 
from 0.52  for the 66-67 age group;  0.71 for age class  72-75;  and 0.88 for the 
81-85 age group.  There are two reasons  for this pattern.  First,  older 
beneficiaries  paid  into the social  security  system  over a fewer number  of 
years,  since  the system started  up  in 1937, and paid  lower tax rates  (OASI 
contribution  rates for employees  increased  from 1 percent  in 1937 to 4.8 
percent  in 1983).  Second, Congress  periodically  increased  OASI benefit  levels 
for retirees  over the last few decades. 
The  results  also indicate  some variation  in the relative  proportion  of 
social  security  annuities  and  transfers by  family  type and race.  The relative -14- 
size of the transfer component  is considerably  greater  for married  couples 
than single  males,  though the results are comparable  for married  couples  and 
single  females.  Moreover,  the transfer component  was proportionately  greater 
for white  families  than black  families, and+the  difference  is particularly 
great on the basis  of the household  portfolio  rate.  At  first glance,  the 
results  seem surprising,  since married men have had, on average, higher 
earnings  than single men, white  families have had,  on average, higher  earnings 
than black  families,  and in addition, married  couples  who had worked  are 
penalized  by  the social security benefit  formula,  which  limits  the spousal 
benefit.  However,  the explanation  stems from differences  in life 
expectancies,  LE, between  groups.  On average,  females have  longer life 
expectancies  than men,  and whites  have considerably  higher  life expectancies 
than blacks  (particularly,  as between males).  As  a result,  the value  of SSEW 
.  .  ,-  i  . 
is c&respondingly  lower for males  than for females,  and for blacks  than for 
whites.  13 




benefit  among elderly  households  by  income  and wealth  class ,and  for 
demographic  groups.  The results show  that the relative  size of the 
component  in social  security benefits  declines  with  income class over 
the lower  income  levels  (up to $15,000 in 1983 dollars),  remains  relatively 
constant  over the middle  income range  ($15,000  to $75,000),  and then declines 
with  income  over the upper  income classes.  This  pattern  is quite similar by 
age group,  family  type, and race.  These results  are also comparable  to those 
of Burkhauser  and Warlick,  who found that for all household  65 and over,  this 
ratio generally  declines with  income for lower  income  levels  (below $4,000  in 
1973 dollars)  and then remains  relatively  constant  above this level.  I find 
an almost  identical pattern  for the 1983 data.  These  results  indicate  that -15- 
the social  security  benefit  formula  is redistributive  relative  to the 
accumulated  value  of social security  contributions.  In other words,  the 
system pays higher  benefits  relative  to total social  security contributions 
for lower  income  families  than higher  income ones.  'i 
However,  interestingly,  there is relatively  little variation  in the 
proportion  of social  security  transfers  in social  security  income by wealth 
class.  This  is most  likely due to the less than perfect correlation  between 
income  and wealth  among elderly  families.  A similar  finding is reported  by 
Hurd and Shoven  (1983), who also found no variation  in this ratio with  wealth 
class. 
B.  Social  Securitv Transfers  Relative  to Total  Income and Wealth.  The 
distributional  impact of social security  transfers  depends not on  it size 
relati,ve-  to total social security  income but on its size relative  to total 
-i  _ 
;i_ 
income  and wealth.  These figures are displayed  in Table 3.  Here, 
d 
considerable  variation  is evident by income  and wealth  class.  Among  all 
households  65 and over in 1983, the ratio of social  security  transfer  income 
to total  income  averages  0.25.  However,  this ratio declines  almost 
monotonically  with  income class,  from a high of 0.59 for households  with 
income between  $7,500 and $9,999  (1983 dollars)  to 0.03 for those with  incomes 
of $.lOO,OOO  or more. 
The  ratio  of social security  transfer  income  to total income  is higher 
for older  age groups  (increasing  from 0.19 for those aged 65-69  to 0.34  to 
those 80 and over).  This  is true despite  the fact that average  social 
security  income  is higher  for younger  ages, because  other sources  of income 
are proportionately  lower for the more aged.  Likewise,  the ratio  is lower for 
married  couples  than for singles,  and for white  families than black  ones.  The 
rationale  is the same:  though married  couples have higher  social  security -16- 
income  than singles  and white  families  receive greater  social  security 
benefits  than black  ones, other  sources of income are proportionately  greater. 
The  overall  ratio of SSTW to total household  wealth  TW  is 0.13  in 1983. 
For household  65 and over, the ratio declines monotonically  with wealth  class, 
from a high  of 0.41 for the lowest  to 0.03 for the highest.  The  ratio also 
shows a moderate  decline by age class.  This result  is an artifact  of the 
method  for computing  SSEW, which  is partly based on conditional  life 
expectancy.  Since this is lower for older people,  the value  of SSEW  is 
likewise  smaller,  as is the value  of SSTW.  The ratio  is also smaller..for 
single  males  than for married  couples  and single  females.  Again,  this is a 
consequence  of their lower conditional  life expectancy.  Finally,  the ratio of 
SSTW to TW  is greater  for black  households  than white  ones, because  elderly 
black  households  hold much  lower wealth  in other  forms. 
:_  I,  I  . 
“c.  Distribution  of Income  and Wealth  among the Elderly.  I next consider 
< 
how  the social  security  transfer  portion has affected  the distribution  of 
income  and wealth  among elderly households.  Has the transfer  component  been 
neutral  or has  it tended to redistribute  income toward  lower income  e,lderly 
households?  To do this, I compare  the actual distribution  of income with one 
in which  only  the social  security  annuity  is provided  to retired  households 
(that is, the transfer  component  is subtracted  from total household  income). 
These  results  are shown in Table  4. 
Among  all households  65 and over,  the Gini coefficient  for total  family 
income  less total social security  income  is 0.72.  If we add only  the social 
security  annuity  income,  the Gini coefficient  falls to 0.66.  If we  then 
include  social  security  transfer  income, the Gini coefficient  falls  to 0.58. 
Thus,  the addition  of total social  security  income to other  income  is highly 
redistributive  among  elderly households.  However,  the predominant  equalizing -II- 
effect  comes  from social security  transfer  income, not  social  security  annuity 
income.  The  former  accounts  for about 60 percent  of  the reduction  in 
inequality,  and the latter  for about 40 percent.  The  results  are quite 
similar  among  diffe'rent  demographic  groups. 
The  same  issue can be addressed with regard  to household  wealth.  In 
this case,  the two effects are similar  in magnitude.  The addition  of social 
security  accumulations  (SSAW) to household  wealth  (HW or HW + PW) has a 
sizable  equalizing  effect, as does the further  inclusion  of social  security 
transfer wealth  (SSTW).  For all households  65 and over,  the Gini5coefficient 
for net worth  (HW) is 0.77,  that for HW plus SSAW  is 0.71,  and that for HW 
plus SSEW  (with g equal to 0.02)  is 0.64.  Here,  too, results  are generally 
quite similar  by age group, household  type, and race.  For black  families,  in 
particuxar,  the effects  are quite large.  In 1983, the Gini coefficient  for HW 
&  :  a  _ 
is v&y  ,high,  0.84;  the addition  of SSAW reduces  the coefficient  to 0.71; and 
the further  addition  of SSTW reduces  it to 0.62,  the same  level as white 
families. 
6.  _  Tax  Implications 
The  tax analysis  is conducted  on the basis of 1989 personal  income tax 
schedules.  The procedure  is as follows:  First,  1983  income  figures  are 
inflated  to 1989 values  using  the CPI.  Second, adjusted  gross  income, AGI,  is 
estimated  as the sum of all income items, excluding  social  security  income. 
The taxable  portion  of social  security  income is then added back  in, according 
to the worksheet  procedure  outlined  in the tax code.  The rate  is based on 
"INCl", defined  as the sum of all income, excluding  half  of social  security 
income.  If INCl is less than $25,000  for single  filers  or $32,000  for joint 
returns,  then all social security  income is excluded  from taxable  income.  If -18- 
INCl exceeds  these limits,  INCl is divided by two, and the lesser  of this 
amount  and  total social security  income  is then included  in AGI. 
Third,  the number  of exemptions  is computed.  Fourth,  the standard 
deduction  is also computed.  This  is based on the filing status of the 
household  and the number  of persons  65 or older  in the household.  Fifth, 
taxable  income  is calculated  as AGI  less the number,of  exemptions  multiplied 
by  $2,000  less the standard  deduction.  Sixth,  federal  income tax is then 
computed  on the basis of the appropriate  tax tables. 
Several  limitations  of the estimation  are apparent:  (i) itemized 
deductions,  particularly  interest payments,  cannot be  included  in the 
analysis;  (ii) the data analysis  cannot  incorporate  capital  gains  in family 
income;  and  (iii) tax-exempt  interest  income or any adjustments  to income  are 
not excluded-  from AGI.  Despite  these limitations,  the results are quite 
ir i_' 
enco%aging.  Total  individual  federal  income taxes collected  in 1989 amounted 
4 
to $445.7  billion  (the source  is the Economic Report  of the President,  1991, 
Table  B-77).  My  tax estimation  produces  a total-  tax figure  for all households 
of $410.2  billion  (only a 8 percent  discrepancy).  The tax estimates  are 
subsequently  increased by 8 percent  to align with  the actual  figure. 
I then recompute  the taxes in the same way, except  that I 
transfer  portion  of social  security  income as taxable  income. 
also  ignore  the worksheet  adjustment  to social  security  income 
now  treat  the 
Moreover,  I 
incorporated  in 
the 1989  tax code.  These estimates  are also increased by 8 percent  for 
alignment  purposes.  It should be noted  that one limitation  of this analysis 
is that behavioral  responses  of social  security beneficiaries  to the new  tax 
schedule  are not considered.  Despite  this, the new tax calculations  can give 
some guidance  to their overall  redistributional  effects  and magnitude. 
The  first point of interest  is the distributional  effects  of the tax 
treatment  change  of social  security  income.  This will depend  on three -19- 
factors:  (i) the ratio of social  security  transfers  to total  income;  (ii) the 
absolute  level of the social  security  transfers;  and (iii) the progressivity 
of the tax schedule,  Though,  as we have  seen from Table  3, the ratio of 
social  security  transfers  to total income  is higher  for lower  income 
households,  the progressivity  of the tax schedule may make  the tax treatment 
change  equalizing  rather  than disequalizing. 
Results  on the relative  incidence of the alternative  tax treatment  of 
social  security  income are shown  in Table  5.  The  first panel  shows  the ratio 
of the new post-tax  income  to the original post-tax  income.  Here,  it is quite 
clear  that the main  losers  are lower income households.  Indeed,  the ratio of 
the new  to old post-tax  income  rises almost monotonically  with  income  class. 
Families  with  incomes of $46,500  or more  (1989 dollars)  actually  pay  less 
taxes under  the alternative  treatment of social security  income.  The reason 
*  .> _ 
is th'at  the actual  1989 tax code, by including a prorated  portion  of social 
* 
security  income,for  high  income  families,  results  in a greater  proportion  of 
social  security  income entering  AGI than the alternative  treatment,  based  on 
the transfer  portion  of social  security  income alone. 
Moreover,  older households  lose out relative  to younger  ones.  For those 
in age group  65-69,  there is a one percent  decline  in after-tax  income with 
the alternative  tax treatment  of social  security  income; for those between  70 
and 79, there is a 3 percent  decline;  and for those 80 and over,  there  is a 
four percent  decline.  Single  females do worse  than single males  under  the new 
tax treatment,  and single  males  do worse  than married  couples.  Black 
households  are slightly worse  off than white households  under  the new tax 
treatment. 
Panel  B shows estimates  of the total tax receipts under  the actual  tax 
code and the alternative  tax treatment of social  security  income.  Total -2o- 
personal  income  taxes paid by  the elderly  in 1989 are estimated  to be 59.5 
billion  dollars.  Under  the new  tax treatment of social  security  income  (and 
estimation  based  on the treasury bill discount  rate),  total taxes are 
estimated  to be  68.0 billion,  or 14 percent higher.  However,  there  is 
considerable  variation  in the incidence of the new  tax burden.  For households 
in age group  65-69,  taxes would  increase by only 8 percent  under  the new  tax 
treatment  of social  security  income; for those between  70 and  74, taxes would 
rise by  17 percent;  for those 75-79, the increase would be 28 percent;  and for 
those 80 and over,  taxes would  rise by 35 percent.  Taxes of married  couples 
would  increase  by  10 percent;  those of single males by 18 percent;  and those 
of single  females by 43 percent.  Black elderly households  would  see their tax 
bills  rise by a staggering  83 percent!  Results based  on the household 
portfoli-o  discount  rate are very  similar. 
A._  r )  _ 
'%lowever,  on net,  the new  tax treatment  is only  slightly  disequalizing  in 
comparison  with,'the  actual  tax schedules  (Panel C).  For all households  65 and 
over, the Gini  coefficient  for pre-tax  income  is 0.58.  The Gini  coefficient 
for post-tax  income based  on the actual  1989 tax code  is 0.51, while ,that 
based  on the new  tax treatment  of social security  income  is 0.52.  This 
pattern  is very  similar by age group, household  type, and race.  Thus, both 
the actual  tax code and the alternative  one are quite  equalizing,  though  the 
redistributional  effects  of the former are slightly  greater  than  that of the 
latter. 
The  other point  of interest  is to determine  the relative  magnitude  of the 
new tax receipts  originating  from the alteration  of the tax treatment  of 
social  security  benefits.  For  this purpose,  comparisons  will be made between 
the new  tax revenue  and the actual  wealth holdings  of young households.  The 
additional  tax revenues  emanating  from the new tax treatment  of social -21- 
security  income amount  to 8.5 billion.  In contrast,  the total net worth  (HW) 
of households  age  30 and under  is 458 billion  (1989) dollars,  and  that of 
households  in age group 31-39  is 746 billion  dollars.  Thus,  if the new  tax 
receipts  were plac?zd  in a capital  fund for young  families,  they would  be  quite 
insignificant  compared  to their actual wealth  (amounting  to 1.9 percent  for 
families  30 and under,  and 0.7 percent  for families  35 and under). 
7.  __  Conclusions 
With  regard  to the distributional  effects  of the social  security  system, 
one of  the most  important  findings  is that social  security  transfers  have 
comprised  the bulk  of social  security  income.  The relative  proportion  of the 
transfer  component  among all retirees  65 and over was 0.85  in 1969,  0.73  in 
1973, and 0.66  in 1983. 
xr "' 
A similar pattern  is evident  when comparing  these 
rati&  among  retirees  of different  age groups  in a given year.  Thus,  most  of 
the social  security  benefits  received by retirees  is a pure government 
transfer,  over and above  the actual  contributions  made  into the system  by  the 
beneficiaries.  In other words,  the benefits  have  far outweighed  the ,annuity 
value  of the social  security  contributions.  However,  the figures  also 
indicate  that the transfer component  of social  security  income has been 
declining  over time  (that is, the annuity portion  has been  rising).  There  are 
two reasons  for this.  First, because  the social  security  system  started  up in 
1937, with  very  low OASI tax rates, more recent  retirees have  contributed  into 
the system  for more years  and at higher  levels  than older ones.  Second, 
federal  legislation  has periodically  increased OASI benefit  levels  for all 
retirees. 
The  redistributional  effects  of social  security  income are very  strong 
among  the elderly.  The Gini coefficient  for family  income  less  (total)  social -22- 
security  income  is 0.72  in 1983, while  that for total family  income  is 0.58. 
However,  the social  security benefit  formula is strongly  redistributive, 
paying  out a higher  benefit  relative  to accumulated  contributions  for lower 
income  families.  This  is evident when comparing  tbe distribution  of pre- 
social  security  transfer  income with  that of post-transfer  income.  In 1983, 
the Gini  coefficient  for family  income excluding  social  security  transfers 
(but including  the social  security  annuity portion)  is 0.66,  compared  to 0.58 
for total  family  income.  Thus,  the predominant  equalizing  effect  of the 
social  security  system  for retirees  comes from social  security  transfer 
income,  not social  security  annuity  income. 
With  regard  to the tax implications  of treating  the transfer  portion  of 
social  security  income as taxable  income, the results  are less  than 
fortuit,pus.  Within  the elderly population,  it is the poorer  groups  that are 
. i-  ”  4 
hard&  hit by the new tax treatment.  Higher  income families  pay less tax 
under  the alternative  tax treatment  than under  the actual  tax code,  and lower 
income  families  pay more  taxes.  Older  families, who are less well  off in 
terms of both  income and wealth,  pay proportionately  higher  taxes  than younger 
ones.  While  the total tax payments  of families 65-69  increase by  8%, those of 
families  80 apd over  increase by 35 percent.  Black families  will  see their 
tax bill  grow by  83 percent,  compared  to 13 percent  for whites.  Thus,  the tax 
incidence  of the new treatment  of social security  income  is far from 
equitable.  However,  it  should be noted  that, on net,  the overall 
distributional  effects  of the new tax system compared  to the actual  code are 
minimal.  The Gini coefficient  for post-tax  income under  the actual  system  is 
0.52, while  that under  the new system  is 0.51. 
Moreover,  the new tax revenues  raised by  the new  tax system  would  not be 
substantial,  particularly  in comparison  to the wealth  holdings  of young -23- 
families.  Total  taxes of families  65 and over would  rise by 8.5 billion,  14 
percent  of their current  taxes,  The new tax revenues  would  amount  to only 1.9 
percent  of the wealth  of families  30 and under and 0.7 percent  of the wealth 
of families  35 and under.  Thus.,  as the funding source  of a "social security 
capital  fund" 
impact  on the 
However, 
for young  families,  the new tax revenues  would have  a minimal 
wealth  of younger  families. 
it should be noted,  in conclusion,  that one can unbundle  the 
loan portion  of the proposed  social  security capital  fund from the new social 
security  taxes collected  -- that is, the loan program  can be based  on\the 
actual  contributions  into the social  security system  (of the individual  or 
family).  New  tax revenues  are not necessarily  needed  in order  to implement 
the loan portion  of the proposed  program.  The loans could be provided  from 
the accumulated  surplus  of the social  security  trust fund, which  has now grown 
I.  :.i-  _ 
to s&stantial  proportions. 
< -24- 
Footnotes 
i  Where  appropriate,  some comparative  estimates  will also be provided  from 
the 1969 MESP database,  created  from a synthetic  match of Internal  Revenue 
Service  tax records  to the 1970 Census  one-in-a-thousand  Public Use  Sample  and 
the capitalization  of selected  income  flows to corresponding  asset  types  (for 
example,  dividends  to stock shares).  The methodology  is described  in detail 
in Wolff  (1980, 1982, and 1983). 
’  The  concept  of wealth  used  is actually  that of "fungible wealth",  i.e.  that 
which  is saleable  and therefore has current  market value.  As a result, 
consumer  durables  and household  inventories,  which  are included  in some 
concepts  of household  wealth,  are excluded here.  The rationale  for excluding 
them in.;this  study  is that their value  represents  consumption  flows  rather 
<.  .i'  _ 
than?ncome  flows,  the analysis  of which  is the principal  objective  here. 
3  This  treatment  assumes  that other  forms of household  savings would  be 
unaffected  by this new institutional  treatment  of social security 
contributions. 
It  is also possible  to define,  in analogous  fashion, pension  accumulation 
wealth,  based on actual  contributions  made by employees  and employers  into 
private  pension  reserves.  However,  this imputation  is much more problematic 
and is not of direct  interest here.  See Wolff  (1987b and forthcoming)  for 
more  discussion. 
4  Separate  imputations  were performed  for husband  and wife and an adjustment 
in the social security benefit  was made  for the surviving  spouse. 
5  However,  the social  security  system  does keep  track of these accumulations 
for each  individual,  and the benefit  received  depends  on this record. 
6  A schooling  variable  is not  included  for the high school  graduate  group. 
7  This  implicitly  assumes  that there is no transitory  component  to current -25- 
income. 
’  For the 1947-83 period,  the figures used are average  hourly  earnings  in 
private  non-agricultural  industries,  adjusted  for overtime  and  interindustry 
employment  shifts?  The data source  is the Economic  Report  of  the President, 
1990  Table  B-44.  -!  Before  1947, I use real total wages  and salaries  per 
employed  person  (computed from Tables  B-24 and B-33). 
'  It would  be desirable  to have  separate values  of g, for each  of the 16 
groups enumerated  above  -- or, at least,  for each of the four schooling 
groups.  Unfortunately,  the data were not available.  As a result,  it is 
assumed  that real earnings  growth  over  time is the same  for each  group,--  that 
is, is equal  to overall mean earnings  growth  in each year. 
lo  It is assumed  throughout  that current workers  retire  at age 65.  In 1969 
and 1983,  65 was  the mandatory  retirement  age for most workers.  It was also 
_? "_' 
the t%rmal  retirement  age as embodied  in the social  security  and most private 
pension benefit('formulae.  Statistically,  it has remained  the modal  retirement 
age since  1962, though  the percent  of the labor force retiring  before  age 65 
has been  increasing  and the proportion  retiring  after 65 has been  dec.lining. 
l1  These  assumptions  will lead to greater  equality  in the distribution  of 
social  security  accumulations  than is likely  to be  the case  in actuality. 
l2  Technically,  the cash surrender  value  of pension  plans  is excluded  from 
HW. 
l3  For married  couples,  the value of LE is the greater  of the two spouses, 
with an adjustment  in SSB for the survivor benefit  (see equation  1). -26- 
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Table  1 
The Ratio  of Social  Security  Transfer Wealth  (SSTW) to Total  Social  Security 
Entitlement  Wealth  (SSEW):  Summary Table,  1983" 
T-Bill  Rateb  Portfolio  RateC 




2.  Age Grout 
a. 65-69 
b.  70-74 
c. 75-79 
d. 80 and over 
3.  Family  Type 
a. Married  Couples 
b.  Single Males 
C.  Single  Females 
0.63  0 57 
0.66  0  61 





0.67  0  63 
0.56  0  49 
0.66  0  61 
4.  Racee 
a:.<_Whites 
b. Blacks 
Addendum:  Overall 
Social  Security 
Income  to Total 
Security  Income 
Ratio  of 
Transfer 
Social 
0.66  0 
0.61  0 









a.  Source:  own calculations  from the 1983 SCF file.  The parameter  g is the 
expected  average  annual  rate of growth of real social  security  benefits  over 
time.  Calculations  are performed  with g=.O2 unless  otherwise  indicated. 
b.  Based  on the annual  one-year  real Treasury bill  rate until  1983 and the 
lo-year  real treasury  bill  rate  from 1983 thereafter. 
C.  Based  on the average  annual  real rate of return  on the average  household 
portfolio,  1962-83.  The source  is Greenwood  and Wolff  (1990). 
d.  Age  group  is based  on the age of the head of household. 
e.  Based  on head  of household.  Families with Hispanic  surnames  are 
classified  as white  or black,  depending  on race.  Whites  include Asians  and 
other  races. -29- 
Table  2 
The  Ratio  of Social  Security Transfers  to Total  Social  Security  Benefits 
By  Income  and Wealth  Class,  and Age Group,  Family  Type and Race,  1983" 
Age Groupb 
Family Type  (65+) 
Percent  Race  (65+)' 
f of HH  Marr.  Sing. Sing. 
(65+)  65+ 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+  Coup. Male  Fem.  White  Black 
A. Income  Class 






















B. Wealth  Class 
Under  $10,000  2 
10,000-74,999  1 
25,0&0:37,499  6 
37,500-4,9,999  6 
50,000-74,999  12 
75,000-99,999  -'  7 
100,000-249,9991  9 
250,000-499,999  7 
500,000  or more  7 
C.  All  100 0  .66  .63  .65  . 68  .73  .67  .56  .66 
No. of HH  (mill.)  16.13 5.59 4.57  3.20 2.77  8.19  1.54  6.41 
Sample  Size  816  298  229  161  128  452  76  288 
77  .74  .76 
68  .68  .64 
66  .68  .62 
64  .61  .63 
66  .62  .66 
64  .64  .57 
67  .66  .69 
61  59 
:62 
.61 
68  .73 
56  .64  d 
57  .44  .66 
9  .67  .65  64  .69  .70 
5  .68  .65  70  .67  77 
7  .67  .65  65  .67  :71 
9  .68  .66  69  .69  72 
4  .66  .66  64  .70  :74 
3  66  .61 
:65  .62 
64  .69  .73 
5  61  .67  .74 
9  .63  .60  66  56  .75 
9  .65  .61  67  171  .70 
78  .78 
71  67 
66  :69 
68  .73 
71  .75 
60  .76 
58  .72 
















.69  .77 
.53  .67 
.49  63 
.50  :61 
.53  .64 





.49  .54 
d  66 
.68  :56 
.67  59  .69 
.69  148  71 
69 
:70 
.48  :70 
.46  .68 
.68  .49  .65 
66 
:66 
58  67 
:61  163 
.63  .57  .69 






















.69  .63 
.69  .64 
.69  .57 
.69  .61 















a.  Source:  own calculations  from the 1983 SCF file, on the basis  of the 
treasury  bill discount  rate. 
b.  Based  on the age of the head of household. 
C.  Based  on head  of household.  Families with  Hispanic  surnames  are 
classified  as white  or black,  depending  on race.  Whites  include Asians  and 
other  races. 
d.  The  cell has  fewer  than 10 observations. -3o- 
Table  3 
The Ratio of Social  Security  Transfers  to Total Income and Wealth 
By Income  and Wealth  Class,  and Age Group,  Family Type and Race,  1983" 
Age Groupb 
Family Type  (65+) 
Race  (65+)' 
M.xrr.  Sing.  Sing. 
65+  65-69  70-74 75-79 80+  Couple Male  Fem.  White  Black 
A. Social  Security  Transfer  Income / Total  Income bv Income Class 
Under  $5,000  .55  .57  .57  .53  .52  ..62  .62  .51 
5,000-7,499  .57  56 
7,500-9,999  .59  :61 
.54  .61  .56  70  .64  .50 
.54  .65  .54  :69  .55  .45 
10,000-14,999  .50  .47  .54  .48  .53  .55  .49  .42 
15,000-19,999  .41  .40  .44  .41  39  .45  .46  33 
20,000-24,999  .31  29 
:30 
.25  .30  :43  .31  .37  123 
25,000-37,499  .27  .24  .20  .25  .28  .38  .24 
37,500-49,999  15 
:10 
16 
50,000-74,999  :07 
-11  22  .09  .17  24  .03 
.13  :06  .18  .lO  :09  .07 
75,000-99,999  .04  .03  .lO  .07  e  .03  e  .27 
100,000  or more  .03  .02  .05  .03  $02  .03  .04  .05 
:60  57  .48  .48 
.60  .54 
.51  .44 
.42  .34 
.30  32 
.28:  :08 
.14  .38 
.09  .li 
04  e 
.03  e 
a  .25  .19  .28  .31  .34  .22  .33  .35  .24  .35 
B. Social  Securitv  Transfer  Wealth  (SSTW) / Total Wealth  (TW) bv Wealth  Classd 
Under.  "$10,000  .41  .46  .40  38  32  .50  .26  35  .43  .37 
lO,OOD-24,999  .39  .41  .46  128  124  .45  .23  :27  .41  .32 
<  25,000-37,499  .32  .40  .35  23  .23  .41  .12  .19  .35  .25 
37,500-49,999  I'  .31  .40  .34  :18  .16  .40  .14  .17  .32  13 
50,000-74,999  .29  35 
:22 
.23  .24  .15  .35  .11  .22  29  :21 
75,000-99,999  22 
117 
.20  .24  .16  .26  08 
100,000-249,999  .22  .16  .ll  11 
:14 
.20  :03 
.13  :21  .28 
.13  .17  .13 
250,000-499,999  .ll  12 
:03 
.lO  .04  .ll  .13  .05  11  .07 
500,000  or more  .03  .04  .02  .Ol  .03  .Ol  .03  :03  .04 
a  .13  .14  .14  .12  .lO  .14  .08  .14  .13  .21 
a.  Source:  own calculations  from the 1983 SCF file, on the basis  of the 
treasury bill discount  rate. 
b.  Based on the age of the head of household 
C.  Based  on head of household.  Families  with Hispanic  surnames  are 
classified  as white  or black,  depending  on race.  Whites  include Asians  and 
other races. 
d.  Total household  wealth  TW = HW + PW + SSEW.  The expected  average  annual 
rate of growth  of real social  security  benefits,  g, is assumed  to be 0.02. 
e.  The cell has  fewer than 10 observations. -31- 
Table 4 
The Distributional  Effects of Social Security  Transfers: 
Gini Coefficients  for Selected  Concepts 
Age Groupb 
65+  65-69  70-74 75-79 80+ 
of Income-and  Wealth,  1983a 
Family Type  (65+) 
Race  (65+)'  t 
Marr.  Sing.  Sing. 
Couple Male  Fem.  White  Black 
A.  Income 
1. Total  Inc.  -  ,716 
Sot. Sec. Inc. 
2. Total  Inc.  -  ,661 
Sot. Sec. Transf 
3. Total  Income  ,578 
B.  Wealthd 
1. HH Wealth(HW)  .771  778  743 
2. HW + SSAW  708 
3. HW + PW  :713 
714  671 
710  682 
4. HW + PW +SSAW  .666  664  628 
c 
a)  g  6" *;  . Ole  T 
5a. I& +.  SSEW  647 
6a. HW+PW+SSEW  :616 
690  706  701  .669  709  .710  .557  .714  .603 
641  638  638  .616  656  .631  ,508  .659  .554 
571  550  539  .533  565  .561  .433  .574  .485 
638  604  .617  .679  .624  .655  .570  .633  .628 
600  571  .587  .651  .592  .617  .534  ,604  .583 
740  .772 
673  .712 
681  .726 
633  ,678 
768  ,766  .695  .754  .840 
705  .684  .624  .693  .711 
712  ,697  .614  .700  .690 
663  .637  .570  .654  .631 
b)  ~=.02~ 
5b. HW + SSEW  .641  ,629  .597 
6b. HW+PW+SSEW  .611  .593  .565 
c)  g=.03e 
5c. HW + SSEW  635 
6c. HW+PW+SSEW  :606 
613  .676  .615  .651  .565  .627  .623 
583  ,649  ,585  .615  .531  .599  .580 
619  ,590  .608  .674  ,606  .647  .561  .621  .617 
585  . 560  .579  .647  .577  .612  ,529  .594  .577 
a.  Source:.  own calculations  from the 1983 SCF f 
treasury bill discount  rate. 
les,  on the basis  of the 
b.  Based on the age of the head  of household. 
C.  Based on head of household.  Families with Hispanic  surnames  are 
classified  as white or black,  depending  on race.  Whites  include Asians  and 
other  races. 
d.  Key:  HW  -- fungible household  wealth;  PW -- pension wealth;  SSAW -- 
social  security  accumulations;  SSEW  -- social security  entitlement  wealth;  and 
SSTW  -- social security  transfer  wealth, where SSTW = SSEW  - SSAW. 
e.  The parameter  g is the expected  average annua 
social  security benefits  over  time. 
rate of growth  of real -32- 
Table  5 
The Ratio  of Alternative  Post-Tax  Income  to Original  Post-Tax  Income 
By Income  Class,  Age Group,  Family Type and Race,  198ga 
Age Group 
Marr.  Sing. Sing. 
65+ 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+  Coup. Male  Fem.  White  Black 
A.  Income  Class:  Treasury  bill  rate (1989 dollars) 
Under  $6,250  .94  .94  .94  .94  .94  .94 
6,250-9,374  .94  .94  .95  .94  .94  93 
9,275-12,499  94 
:95 
.94  .95  .94  .94  :93 
12,500-18,749  95 
:96 
.96  .95  .94  .94 
18,750-24,999  .95  .95  .95  .95  95 
25,000-31,249  .97  .97  98 












46,875-62,499  lo1 
62,500-93,749  1.01 1.01  1.02  1.01 1.02  1.01 
93,750-125,499  1.01 1.01  1.04  1.01  --  1.01 
125,000  or more  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 
&lJ  .98  .99  .97  .97  .96  .98 
B. Total  Tax Payments  (billions,  1989$) 
1.  Original  Taxes  59.5 34.4  14.0  6.7  4.4  48.8 
*.  ..  . 
<  ‘. 
(a) Treasurv  bill  rate 
2a. Additional  Taxes  8.5  2.6  2.4  1.9  1.5  4.9 
3a. Percentage  :'  14%  8%  17%  28%  35%  10% 
Change  in Tax Bill 
(b) Household  portfolio  rate 
2a. Additional  Taxes  7.6  2.5  2.2  1.6  1.3  4.4 
3a. Percentage  13%  7%  16%  25%  31%  9% 
Change  in Tax Bill 
C. Gini  Coefficients 
1.  Pre-Tax  Income  .578 ,571  .550  .539 ,533  .565 
(a) Treasury  bill  rate 
2a. Original  Post-  .508 .505  .479  ,467 .466  ,489 
Tax  Income 
3a. Alternative  .520  .517  ,491  ,479 .476  .504 
Post-Tax  Income 
_(b)  Household  portfolio  rate 
2b. Original  Post-  .508 ,505  .479  .467 .466  .489 
Tax  Income 
3b. Alternative  , 520  .517  ,490  ,478 .475  .503 
Post-Tax  Income 
.94  .94  .94  .95 
.95  .95  .94  .96 
.96  95  .94  .95 
.96  :96  .95  .96 
96 
:96 
.96  95 
:97 
97 
98  :97 
.96  198  .97  .99 
1.03  1.00  1.p1  97 
1.02  1.02  1.01  1:02 
_-  1.04  1.01  -_ 
1.01  1.01  1.00  1.00 
.97  .96  .98  .97 
4.1  6.6  58.6  1.0 
0.8  ~2  . 8  7.6  0.8 
18%  43%  13%  83% 
0.6  2.6 
16%  40% 
0.7 
82% 















,485  .373  .421 
,494  .381  .429 
a.  Source:  own calculations  from the 1983 SCF file.  See text for details  on 
tax calculations. 